Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games:An Experimental Study by Duffy, John & Matros, Alexander
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: An Experimental
Study








Please cite this article as: John Duffy, Alexander Matros, Stochastic Asymmetric
Blotto Games: An Experimental Study, <![CDATA[Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization]]> (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.05.005
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.









Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: An Experimental Study
John Duffy∗ Alexander Matros†
April 25, 2017
Abstract. We consider a model where two players compete for n items having
diﬀerent common values in a Blotto game. Players must decide how to allocate their
common budgets across all n items. The winner of each item is determined stochasti-
cally using a lottery mechanism which yields a unique equilibrium in pure strategies.
We analyze behavior under two competing payoﬀ objectives found in the Blotto games
literature that have not been previously compared: (i) players aim to maximize their
total expected payoﬀ and (ii) players maximize the probability of winning a majority
value of all n items. We report results from an experiment where subjects face both
payoﬀ objectives and we find support for the diﬀering theoretical predictions.
Keywords: Colonel Blotto game, Contests, Resource Allocation, Lotteries, Electoral
College, Game Theory, Political Theory, Experimental Economics.
JEL Classification Nos. C72, C73, C92, D72, D74.
Acknowledgments: We gratefully acknowledge funding for this project from the
Dietrich School of Arts and Sciences of the University of Pittsburgh. We thank Michael
LeGower for research assistance.
∗Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine. Email: duﬀy@uci.edu.
†Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina and Lancaster University Management School.
Email: alexander.matros@gmail.com









Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: An Experimental Study 1
1. Introduction
Resource allocation plays a central role in both economics and politics. A well-studied game-
theoretic representation of the resource allocation problem is the Colonel Blotto game (Borel,
1921) which models the problem as a two-player non-cooperative game. In the canonical
“Blotto” game, there are (2 + 1) battlefields of equal value. The two players have fixed
endowments of resources, e.g., troops or money, which they must simultaneously allocate to
each of the (2 + 1) battlefields. The winner of each battlefield is determined according
to which player allocated the greater amount of resources to that battlefield. The standard
objective function for each player is to win  + 1 or more (a majority) of the battlefields
although an alternative objective function is to win as many battlefields as possible.
In this paper we experimentally study behavior in two-player, -item (or battlefield) sto-
chastic asymmetric Blotto games where the  items have commonly known but asymmetric
values, and the winner of each item is determined stochastically using a simple lottery mech-
anism. The lottery mechanism for awarding each item makes the payoﬀ function continuous,
by contrast with the canonical deterministic (or auction) version of the Blotto game, re-
sulting in a unique pure strategy equilibrium allocation of players’ endowments across the
 items. Thus, the stochastic Blotto game environment provides crisp predictions for an
experimental evaluation by contrast with the deterministic version of the Blotto game which
yields a multiplicity of possible equilibria typically in mixed strategies. Within the stochastic
Blotto game environment, we compare and contrast behavior under two diﬀerent objective
functions. In the first case, as originally studied by Friedman (1958), the players’ objective
is to maximize their total expected earnings from allocating their budget across all  bat-
tlefields. In the second case, as originally studied by Lake (1978), the players’ objective is
to win a majority of the values of the  battlefields. To our knowledge, there is no prior
experimental work comparing these two diﬀerent, but commonly used objective functions
for Blotto games.
A motivating example for the “total rule” version of the stochastic asymmetric Blotto
game comes from advertising decisions by two firms in a duopoly setting. The two firms
produce and sell an identical good and must decide how to allocate their advertising budgets
over  markets having various diﬀerent sales potentials that are common to both firms. As
advertising is not perfectly eﬀective in stimulating sales of the good, increased expenditures
in any given market may have only a stochastically larger impact on each firms’ sales of the
good in that market. However, both duopolists’ goal is to maximize the total market share
for their product and not just a majority share as in the electoral college example.
A motivating example for the “majority rule” version of the stochastic asymmetric Blotto
game is the U.S. electoral college mechanism for determining the President of the United
States. The electoral college system is a two-player, stochastic asymmetric majority-rule
Blotto game in the sense that: 1) there are typically just two presidential candidates; 2)
the 51 states (including the District of Columbia) have diﬀerent numbers of electoral votes
(values) ranging from a minimum of 3 to a maximum (as of 2012) of 55 votes (for the state
of California); 3) the presidential candidate who spends the most resources (campaign ex-
penditures) on any given state has a greater chance of winning that state’s electoral votes,
but does not necessarily win, i.e., the winner is stochastically determined. 1 4) the over-
1For example in the 2012 U.S. Presidential election, candidate Barak Obama and aﬃliated political action
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all winner of the Presidency is the candidate who earns a majority of the total electoral
votes (currently 538), that is, the objective is to achieve a majority of the asymmetric and
stochastically awarded prize values (electoral votes).
We note that while these two objective functions (total and majority) might seem to be
quite similar, equilibrium resource allocation by the two players under each objective function
can be dramatically diﬀerent. Under the total rule, equilibrium bids are proportional to
the values of each of the  battlefields, while under the majority rule, equilibrium bids
reflect diﬀerences in the pivotality of each battlefield in achieving a majority share of the
value of all  battlefields. Thus, the motivation for our study is to explore whether the
diﬀerences in equilibrium predictions for the two objective functions find empirical support
in a laboratory experiment. We present results from a within-subjects experimental design
involving two diﬀerent versions of a 4-item stochastic asymmetric Blotto game where subjects
make resource allocation decisions under both the total and majority rules. Our experiment
yields support for the diﬀerent equilibrium allocation predictions under the two diﬀerent
payoﬀ objective functions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related
literature. Section 3 provides a theoretical framework for comparing equilibria under the two
diﬀerent objective functions for the stochastic asymmetric Blotto game. Section 4 describes
our experimental design and Section 5 reports our main experimental findings. Section 6
concludes with a summary and some suggestions for future research.
2. Related Literature
The Colonel Blotto game is one of the oldest games in game theory. It was originally pro-
posed by Borel (1921), who considered the  = 3 battlefield case. Gross and Wagner (1950)
considered the more general  ≥ 2 case and introduced the name Colonel Blotto. Other the-
oretical contributions include: Borel and Ville (1938), Blackett (1954, 1958), Bellman (1969),
Shubik and Weber (1981) and Weinstein (2012). Recent work on the Colonel Blotto game
has considered asymmetries in the players’ resources, Hart (2008), Roberson (2006), Mac-
donell and Mastronardi (2010); non-constant-sum versions of the game, Kvasov (2007), Pow-
ell (2009), Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2010, 2012), Roberson and Kvasov (2012);
more general payoﬀs, Golman and Page (2009); incomplete information, Adamo and Matros
(2009), Kovenock and Roberson (2011); alliances among players, Kovenock and Roberson
(2012a); and various applications in political economy, Brams and Davis (1973, 1974), Colan-
toni, Levesque, and Ordeshook (1975), Young (1978), Bartels (1985), Shaw (1999), Laslier
(2002), Laslier and Picard (2002), Sahuguet and Persico (2006), Powell (2007), Roberson
(2008) and Bell and Wilson (2012). Much of the literature is surveyed in Kovenock and
Roberson (2012b).
More relevant to this paper, Friedman (1958) was the first to provide analytic results
for the stochastic asymmetric “total rule”Blotto game where the winner of each item  is
determined by a lottery in which the chance of winning is proportional to each player’s
committees spent $69.3 million USD in the state of Florida while candidate Mitt Romney and aﬃliated
political action committees spent $81.3 million USD in Florida (Bell and Wilson (2012)). Despite being out
spent in Florida, candidate Obama nevertheless won Florida’s 29 electoral votes in the 2012 presidential
election.
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allocation of resources to item , i.e., a standard Tullock (1980) contest success function.2
Friedman describes a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium which we test in our experi-
ment. Lake (1978) was the first to study a stochastic asymmetric “majority rule” Blotto
game. Lake studied the case of equal budget constraints, which we also employ in our exper-
iment. The equilibrium prediction in the majority rule case with equal budget constraints
is that allocation of resources to item  should equal the Banzhaf Power Index for item .
In a companion paper, Duﬀy and Matros (2015), we generalize Lake’s (1978) theoretical
findings to asymmetric stochastic Blotto games involving  players and asymmetric budget
constraints, i.e.,  6=  and we theoretically compare and contrast the predictions for the
stochastic asymmetric Blotto game under the total and majority rule objectives.
Snyder (1989) analyzes an election model where players have cost functions instead of
given budgets (or endowments). He was the first to compare equilibrium behavior under two
diﬀerent assumptions about the candidates’ objectives 1) the total rule, where candidates
maximize the expected total number of votes, and 2) the majority rule, where candidates
maximize their probabilities to win a majority of the total votes. Klumpp and Polborn (2006)
use Snyder’s framework to develop a costly advertising model of political competition (both
simultaneous and sequential) in which candidates have to win the majority of a number of
electoral districts in order to obtain a certain prize. In both of these papers, the setting
diﬀers from the environment we study due to the presence of cost functions as opposed to
endowments and budget constraints. More importantly in both Snyder (1989) and Klumpp
and Polborn (2006), the value of each item (or of each electoral district) is the same. By
contrast we study the more general case where the value of the individual items may be
diﬀerent from one another, as in the number of electoral votes per state in the U.S. electoral
college, or the sales potential of diﬀerent markets for a good.
Even more relevant to this paper are several experimental studies of Blotto games. Avra-
hami and Kareev (2009) consider a version of the Blotto game where players have identical
valuations for the  items but diﬀerent budgets. In their lottery version of the game, only
one box is opened for each player and the winner is determined by comparing allocations
in those two boxes. Avrahami et al. (2014) consider a similar lottery version of Blotto
where the battlefields also diﬀer in their likelihood of being chosen which is similar to the
asymmetric values we assigned to battlefields in our setting.
Modzelewski, Stein, and Yu (2009) analyze the classic (auction) Blotto game with 6
identically valued battlefields and equal resources. Arad and Rubinstein (2012) consider
a large web-based experiment of a tournament version of the Blotto game with 6 battles
and equal resources. Chowdhury, Kovenock, and Sheremeta (2013) investigate two types of
Blotto games: stochastic (lottery) and deterministic (auction) versions where all battlefields
have identical values but where the two players may have asymmetric resources. Several
recent experimental studies consider Blotto games with asymmetric item values as in this
paper, but these studies all use deterministic (auction) rules for determining the winner of
each item. Hortala-Vallve and Llorente-Saguer (2010) examine an incomplete information
Blotto game with both asymmetric and heterogeneous battlefield valuations so that the
game is no longer zero-sum. Hortala-Vallve, Llorente-Saguer and Nagel (2013) and Hortala-
2Monahan (1987) and Robson (2005) generalize Friedman’s model. Monahan allows costly eﬀort and
Robson considers more general versions of Tullock’s contest success function.
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Vallve, Llorente-Saguer (2015) report on further experiments in similar settings but where
the players can either communicate with one another or there is complete information about
the player’s heterogeneous valuations. Montero, Possajennikov, Sefton and Turocy (2016)
conduct an experimental test of Young’s (1978) model where two lobbyists allocate resources
to politicians having diﬀerent voting powers and seek to obtain a majority of votes cast for
their opposed positions. Mago and Sheremeta (2016) examine behavior in simultaneous and
sequential Blotto games with symmetric battlefield values, a deterministic (auction) rule and
a majoritarian objective.
By contrast, the contribution of this paper is to experimentally compare and contrast
Blotto games where: 1) the items (battlefields) have asymmetric but commonly known values
2) the items (battlefields) are awarded according to a (stochastic) lottery mechanism so that
the unique equilibrium prediction is always in pure strategies and 3) the objective function
is either to maximize total expected payoﬀ or to win a majority of the value of all items. Our
main focus is on whether subjects appreciate the subtleties of these two diﬀerent objective
functions in allocating resources across the diﬀerently-valued battlefields. We are not aware
of any prior experimental comparison of these two diﬀerent, but commonly studied objective
functions for Blotto games. As noted in the introduction, these two diﬀerent versions of the
asymmetric, stochastic Blotto game are of real-world interest in understanding advertising
decisions by competing duopolists and resource allocation by U.S. presidential candidates
competing to win the Electoral College.
3. Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games
The game we study involves two players  and , and  items. Player  has a given budget
of size  and player  has a given budget of size  . Let = {1  } denote the set of
the  items (or battlefields). Each item  has a known value,   0, that is the same for
both players. The two players compete for these items by simultaneously allocating their
budgets across all  items. A pure strategy for player  is a nonnegative −dimensional
vector (1  ), such that P=1  =  and  is player ’s spending on item . A pure
strategy for player , (1  ), is determined analogously with P=1  =  . Each item is
allocated by means of a lottery in which player  obtains item  with probability  ( + )
and player  obtains item  with probability  ( + ).34 Without loss of generality, for
the rest of the paper we shall assume that
1 ≥  ≥  0. (1)





3.1. Plurality: Maximizing the expected value. Friedman (1958) describes a Nash







3We assume that if x = y = 0, then each player has .5 probability to win item i.
4We assume that all lotteries are statistically independent.













 =  and  ≥ 0 ∀
for player  and analogously for player .
Theorem 1. (Friedman, 1958) The stochastic Blotto game where players seek to maximize
their expected item values has a unique Nash equilibrium. In this Nash equilibrium,














The expected equilibrium payoﬀs are +  for player  and +  for player 
We highlight several important features of Theorem 1. First, the Nash equilibrium is
unique. Second, both players compete for all items in the Nash equilibrium of this version of
the Blotto game. Third, the Nash equilibrium has a monotonic property: the player with
the greater budget has a greater chance to win each item.5
3.2. Weighted Majority: Maximizing the probability of winning a majority.
We now assume that each player wants to maximize her probability to win a majority of
all items’ values as in the U.S. electoral college example. Note that each possible coalition
of items {1 } can be represented by a binary, -dimensional characteristic vector
(1  )  where  ∈ {0 1} for any  = 1  . If  = 1 then item  belongs to the
coalition, and if  = 0 then item  does not belong to the coalition. We will use the
corresponding characteristic vector to represent a coalition in the rest of the paper. There
are 2 such coalitions.
Denote by V the set of winning coalitions under the win-a-majority-of-item-values ob-






We next make a technical assumption that guarantees a unique majority winner in all






for any coalition (1  ) . (4)
5We note further that if one wanted to relax the assumption of risk neutral preferences, it is a simple
matter to transform the maximization problem in this section to one of expected utility maximization, e.g., by
replacing W in the maximization problem with U(W) where U() is some utility function. The equilibrium
bid vector in the expected utility case would generally diﬀer from the risk neutral case, but it would continue
to be unique. For the majority rule case discussed in the next section, such utility transformations will not
aﬀect equilibrium bids as payoﬀs are winner-take-all.
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A stronger version of Assumption 1 is typical in the literature. Usually in this literature,
all values are the same, 1 =  = , in which case Assumption 1 becomes  = 2 + 1
 = 1 2 
A player wins the stochastic majority Blotto game if she gets a winning coalition. Without
loss of generality, a player receives a payoﬀ of 1 from winning the game and a payoﬀ of 0
from losing the game. Player  maximizes her chance to get a winning coalition by solving

























+ is the probability to lose all the items that do not belong to the coalition
(1  ).
















 =  (8)
We will need the following definition.
Definition 1. An item  is pivotal in coalitions (1  −1 1 +1  ) and (1  −1 0 +1  )
if (1  −1 1 +1  ) is a winning coalition and (1  −1 0 +1  ) is a losing coali-
tion.
Denote by V a set of winning coalitions where item  is pivotal. Denote by  () the
number of winning coalitions in which item  is pivotal, or
 () = kVk = X
(1)∈V
1 (9)
We now introduce the Banzhaf Power Index6 for item  in the following way:
() = ()(1) + + () =
P
(1)∈V 1P
(1)∈V1 1 + +P(1)∈V 1  (10)
Intuitively, the Banzhaf Power Index for item  measures the probability that item  will be
pivotal as part of a winning coalition. Using this definition, and following Lake (1978), we
can now characterize the Nash equilibrium for the asymmetric stochastic Blotto game where
both players seek to maximize their probability of winning a majority of all items’ values.
6See Banzhaf (1965) for discussion.
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Theorem 2. (Lake, 1978) Suppose that conditions (4) and  =  hold. Then, the sto-
chastic Blotto game where players seek to maximize their chance of winning a majority of
the item values has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which  =  () and
 =  () for  = 1 2  
A comparison of equilibrium allocations under the two diﬀerent, but seemingly similar
objective functions — the total and the majority rules — as given in Theorems 1 and 2 reveals
that the unique equilibrium allocations of resources to the  items can be quite diﬀerent from
one another. A natural question is whether these diﬀerences are simply a theoretical curiosity
or whether they are indeed empirically relevant to subjects incentivized to play according
to the two diﬀerent objective functions. To address this important question we designed an
experiment to test equilibrium predictions in stochastic asymmetric Blotto games under the
two diﬀerent objective functions.
4. Experimental Design
The main objective of our experiment is to test the predictions found in Theorems 1 and
2 regarding the equilibrium allocation of players’ endowments toward winning the  prizes
under the two diﬀerent payoﬀ rules. Toward that goal we chose to consider a two player,
 = 4 item asymmetric value, stochastic Blotto game. We focus on the  = 4 case because
it represents the smallest value of  for which the diﬀerences in allocations under the two
payoﬀ rules can be suﬃciently distinct from one another. For simplicity, we also study the
case where the two players have equal budgets, leaving the case of asymmetric budgets to
future research. Under these conditions, the equilibrium allocations are unique under both
rules (Theorems 1 and 2).
Our experiment involves a 2× 2× 2 experimental design involving three main treatment
variables: 1) the payoﬀ rule: players either seek to maximize the total expected value of
prize items (“the total rule”) or to maximize their chance of winning a majority of the value
of all items (“the majority rule”); 2) the vector of values of the four prize items (labeled
Version 1 and Version 2): we chose to consider two diﬀerent prize value vectors to test some
of the comparative statics implications of the theory as detailed below; 3) the order in which
subjects allocated resources to the four prizes: we consider the case where the prizes were
presented in descending order (highest to lowest value prize) or in ascending order (lowest to
highest value prize). This last treatment was intended to check whether there might be any
behavioral biases arising from the order in which prizes of diﬀerent values were presented. In
addition, as we use a within-subjects experimental design, we also vary the order in which
subjects make decisions under a given rule, total or majority as detailed below.
Under the total rule, a player receives in points the total value of any and all items won.
Under both prize Versions 1 and 2, the total value of all four items sums to 100 points. Thus
under the total rule, a player can get a positive number of points if she wins one or more of
the four items. The game is constant sum: one player’s earnings are 100 minus the earnings
of the other player.
The majority rule game is also constant sum but the payoﬀ earnings are diﬀerent. Under
majority rule, a player wins the game if the value of all her won items is greater than the
value of the items won by her opponent. The winner of the majority rule game thus receives
100 points and the loser receives  points, that is, the majority rule game is “winner take
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all.” The prize valuations respect our Assumption 1 (condition (4)) so the majority winner
is always unambiguous in our setup.
In all four treatments, the play of a round of the asymmetric stochastic Blotto game
proceeds as follows. First, subjects are randomly and anonymously paired with one another
with all possible pairings being equally likely in their matching group of size six. Next,
both players in each pair are given a budget of 120 tokens and instructed that each must
allocate all of their 120 tokens toward winning the four items. Both players submit their
token allocations simultaneously and without communication using a computer interface
developed for this study. The program checks that the four allocations made by each player
to the four items exactly sum up to 120; if not, then a player is prompted to resubmit
his or her allocation until the budget of 120 tokens has been fully exhausted. Thus, the
pure strategy of player  is a 4-dimensional vector (1  4), such that P4=1  = 120 and
the pure strategy of his opponent, player , is a 4-dimensional vector (1  4), such thatP4=1  = 120.
The four items have diﬀerent but commonly known valuations, ,  = 1  4. These
valuations remained constant across all rounds of a session. Item  is allocated by means of
a lottery in which player  wins item  with probability  ( + ) and player  wins item 
with probability  ( + ). In the event that  =  = 0, then each of the two players has
a 05 probability of winning item . The lottery mechanism for awarding prizes was carefully
explained to subjects in the written instructions. Example scenarios were presented and
subjects had to successfully complete a quiz demonstrating their knowledge of the lottery
mechanism used to determine the winners of each of the four items prior to the start of the
experiment.
As mentioned, we considered two versions for the distribution of values across the four
items.
4.1. Version 1. In this treatment, the four items had the known values:
1 = 35 2 = 30 3 = 25 4 = 10
The value of these four items sum to 100 points. Given that both players have a fixed budget
of 120 tokens, Table 1 gives the unique equilibrium predictions regarding the allocation of
tokens across the four items under the total and majority rules for prize vector Version 1.
These predictions follow from Theorems 1 and 2.
Prize Vector Eq. Token Allocation Under
Version 1 Majority Rule Total Rule
1 = 35 40 120× 35100 = 422 = 30 40 120× 30100 = 363 = 25 40 120× 25100 = 304 = 10 0 120× 10100 = 12
Table 1: Equilibrium Predictions for Prize Vector Version 1









Stochastic Asymmetric Blotto Games: An Experimental Study 9
Notice that our parameterization of the experiment induces distinct diﬀerences in equi-
librium bids between the two rules. A complete characterization of the points and dollar
earnings possible in this version of the experiment (and the next) is given in the payoﬀ table
of the experimental instructions found in Appendix A of the online supplementary materials.
4.2. Version 2. In this treatment, the four items had the known values:
1 = 45 2 = 25 3 = 20 4 = 10
The values of the four items again sum to 100 points. Notice that Version 2 diﬀers from
Version 1 only in the values assigned to the first three items; the value of the fourth prize is
10 in both treatments, (prize versions), a feature we will later exploit in our analysis of the
experimental data. Under the maintained assumption that both players have a fixed budget
of 120 tokens, Table 2 gives the equilibrium predictions regarding the allocation of tokens
across the four items under the majority and total rules for prize vector Version 2.
Prize Vector Eq. Token Allocation Under
Version 2 Majority Rule Total Rule
1 = 45 60 120× 45100 = 542 = 25 20 120× 25100 = 303 = 20 20 120× 20100 = 244 = 10 20 120× 10100 = 12
Table 2: Equilibrium Predictions for Prize Vector Version 2
Notice that the two diﬀerent versions for the vector of prize values (Versions 1 and 2)
yield strikingly contrasting predictions as to how subjects should allocate their tokens, and
indeed, that is why we chose these two diﬀerent sets of prize values. In particular, observe
that for Version 1, under the Majority rule, there should be zero allocation to an item that
can never be pivotal (item 4). Further, when payoﬀs are determined by the Majority rule,
allocations should be the same across the first three items under Version 1 while under
Version 2, allocations should be the same across the last three items. By contrast, for both
prize vector versions, allocations under the Total rule should be proportional to the prize
values.
4.3. Interface. In each period of the experiment, subjects saw two screens. The first
screen was the decision screen, where subjects chose how to allocate their tokens across the
four items. Subjects were reminded on this decision screen of the prize values of the four
items which were presented to subjects either in descending order from highest to lowest
value or in ascending order from lowest to highest value (a further treatment condition).
Next to each prize value, subjects entered their bids and the program checked that bids for
all items were non-negative and summed to 120, the common endowment of tokens for each
subject.
After all pairs had submitted their bids the winners of each of the four items in each
pair were determined by the computer program and the results were shown to subjects on a
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Figure 1: Illustration of the depiction of the results from play of treatment version 1 under
the total rule.
results screen, which utilized pie charts to convey the chances that both subjects in a pair
had of winning the four diﬀerent items. An illustration of this results screen for Version 1
under the total rule is shown in Figure 1. This results screen further revealed the number of
tokens that each player in the pair had allocated toward winning the four items and reported
on whether a player had won or lost each prize, their total points earned and their dollar
earnings for that round. The results screen for the majority rule treatment was the same as
shown in Figure 1 for the total rule treatment, except that “round earnings” would either
be $20 or $0, depending on whether or not a player’s “total points earned” exceeded 50 of
the 100 possible points (a majority). It was public knowledge that the point earnings of the
other player in each match were always 100 minus the player’s own point earnings. Subjects
only saw results for their own pair.
4.4. Session Characteristics. Each session involved 18 subjects divided up into 3
matching groups of size 6. Subjects were randomly matched only with the five other mem-
bers of their matching group in all rounds of each session. Thus, each session yields three
independent observations or what we label ‘groups’. We conducted two sessions of each of
our four treatments. Thus we have data from 8 sessions involving 8 × 18 = 144 subjects
divided up into 24 matching groups.
In each session, the vector of prize values {1234} was set either according to
Version 1 or Version 2 and the prize vector remained constant for the duration of the ses-
sion. As noted earlier, we used a within-subjects design where subjects in each matching
group/session played the first 20 rounds under either the majority or the total rule treatment.
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Following the 20th round, the experiment was paused and subjects were given new, contin-
uation instructions informing them that in the remaining 20 rounds they would be playing
under the opposite rule, either the total or the majority rule treatment. This treatment
change was not announced in advance. Thus each session involved play of 20 rounds of both
payoﬀ rules (40 rounds total) all under the same vector of item values. Sessions 1-4 used
Version 1 for the prize values, {35 30 25 10} while sessions 5-8 used Version 2 for the prize
values, {45 25 20 10}. We chose a within-subjects design as it is statistically more powerful
than a between-subject design since in a within-subject design, each subject serves as their
own control (e.g., being in both objective function treatments) thereby minimizing the eﬀects
of individual diﬀerences.7 At the same time, within-subject designs mean that treatment
order can matter and to minimize this possibility, in one-half of the sessions of each payoﬀ
vector treatment (Version 1 or Version 2) subjects played under the majority rule for the
first 20 rounds followed by play under the total rule for the last 20 rounds, while in the other
half of the sessions of each payoﬀ vector treatment this order was reversed. As noted earlier,
we also varied the order in which the list of prize values was presented to subjects and their
resource allocations were elicited. In half of the sessions of each payoﬀ vector treatment,
prize values were presented and resource allocations were elicited in descending order (e.g.,
{35 30 25 10}) while in the other half they were presented and elicited in ascending order
(e.g., {10 25 30 35}). The precise details of our eight experimental sessions are summarized
in Table 3.
Session Item Value Payoﬀ Rule No. of No. of Group
Number List Order Treatment Order Subjects Indep. Obs. Nos.
1 {35 30 25 10} Majority then Total 18 3 1—3
2 {35 30 25 10} Total then Majority 18 3 4—6
3 {10 25 30 35} Majority then Total 18 3 7—9
4 {10 25 30 35} Total then Majority 18 3 10—12
5 {45 25 20 10} Majority then Total 18 3 1—3
6 {45 25 20 10} Total then Majority 18 3 4—6
7 {10 20 25 45} Majority then Total 18 3 7—9
8 {10 20 25 45} Total then Majority 18 3 10—12
Table 3: Characteristics of Experimental Sessions
A copy of the written instructions used in session 1 where the majority rule was played
in the first 20 rounds and the total rule was played in the last 20 rounds all under prize
Version 1 with descending prize values is given in Appendix A of the online supplementary
materials. Instructions for other sessions/treatments are similar.
The experiment was programmed using Willow, a Python-based toolkit for conducting
economics experiments.8 Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate population of
7See, e.g., Camerer (2003), pp. 41-42.
8Willow was developed by Jaap Weel at George Mason University and is available at:
http://econwillow.sourceforge.net/
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the University of Pittsburgh and the experiments were all conducted in the Pittsburgh
Experimental Economics Laboratory. No subject participated in more than one session of
this study.
4.5. Payments. Subjects were paid their point earnings from two randomly chosen
rounds, one from the first 20 rounds played and one from the second 20 rounds played.
Points from these two randomly chosen rounds were converted into dollars at the fixed and
known rate of 1 point = 20 cents (so 100 points = $20). In addition, subjects were given a
$5 show-up payment. Thus the maximum total payoﬀ that subjects could earn (including
the $5 show-up payment) was $45, the minimum payment was $5 and the average payoﬀ
was $25 for participation in a 90-minute experimental session.
5. Experimental Results
The main comparative statics implications of our treatments concern the allocation of sub-
jects’ endowment of 120 tokens across the four items having the prize values of Version 1
or Version 2 and under the diﬀerent payoﬀ rules, the majority rule or the total rule. Our
experimental results consist of a number of diﬀerent findings.
Finding 1. Mean bids are close to Nash equilibrium bids but are significantly diﬀerent in
three of the four main treatments. Nevertheless, NE bids remain a best response to the data
in all four treatments.
Figure 2: Average Bids under the Majority and Total Rules, Version 1 {35, 30, 25, 10}.
Pooled Data from All Rounds Played by All 12 Groups.
Support for finding 1 can be found in Figures 2-3 which show the mean bids for each of the
four items by all subjects participating in each of the four treatments using pooled data from
all 12 groups of the four main treatments: Version 1, Majority and Total Rule and Version 2,
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Treatment Majority Rule Version 1 Total Rule Version 1
Prize Value 35.00 30.00 25.00 10.00 35.00 30.00 25.00 10.00
Nash Bid 40.00 40.00 40.00 0.00 42.00 36.00 30.00 12.00
Mean Bid 34.73 45.08 35.92 4.26 44.58 39.69 27.70 8.04
(StDev) (8.29) (5.66) (6.39) (1.95) (4.48) (3.78) (2.76) (2.79)
WSRT p-value 0.06 0.01 0.12 † 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.00
Mean Bid L5 33.33 45.87 36.20 2.92 44.71 38.95 28.18 8.16
(StDev) L5 (10.41) (6.93) (8.94) (1.94) (4.39) (4.56) (2.81) (3.15)
WSRT L5 p-value 0.07 0.02 0.21 † 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.01
Treatment Majority Rule Version 2 Total Rule Version 2
Prize Value 45.00 25.00 20.00 10.00 45.00 25.00 20.00 10.00
Nash Bid 60.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 54.00 30.00 24.00 12.00
Mean Bid 58.94 22.72 19.42 18.92 60.06 31.84 19.07 9.03
(StDev) (6.90) (3.48) (4.60) (4.66) (5.73) (1.64) (4.40) (3.10)
WSRT p-value 0.35 0.01 0.72 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Mean Bid L5 56.89 22.78 20.56 19.77 61.43 31.21 18.67 8.70
(StDev) L5 (9.32) (5.17) (6.27) (6.58) (9.46) (2.23) (5.16) (4.45)
WSRT L5 p-value 0.39 0.12 0.81 0.88 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.03
† Since the Nash bid prediction in this case equals the lower bound of 0, a Wilcoxon signed
rank test is not appropriate. Still, mean bids for this item are the closest to zero. Bids
for this item were greater than zero 57.3 percent of the time over all rounds but only 54.2
percent over the last 5 rounds (L5). According to a two-tailed binomial test, the frequency
of positive bids over all rounds is significantly greater than 50 percent (p < .01) but not
over the last 5 rounds (p = .13). Note also that mean bids for this item are 2 standard
deviations greater than 0 over all rounds, but only 1.5 standard deviations greater than 0
over the last 5 rounds.
Table 4: Mean bids compared with Nash bids
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Figure 3: Average Bids under the Majority and Total Rules, Version 2 {45, 25, 20, 10}.
Pooled Data from All Rounds Played by All 12 Groups
Majority and Total Rule.9 The Nash equilibrium bid for each item is given by the left-most
bar (the one colored black), while the second (red (or lighter)—colored) bars represent the
mean amounts bid on each item by subjects. Figures 2-3 give the impression as conveyed
in Finding 1 that Nash equilibrium provides a good but imperfect way of characterizing
bidding behavior in our experiment. Table 4 reports the same mean bids shown in Figures
2-3 along with their associated standard deviations for each treatment/prize value over all
20 rounds and over the last 5 rounds only (L5).10 In addition, Table 4 reports -values from
a two-sided, one-sample Wilcoxon signed-rank test (WSRT) of the null hypothesis that the
12 independent group-level mean bids for each prize/treatment condition (as reported in
Tables 10-13 of Appendix B, online supplementary materials) equal the Nash equilibrium
predicted bids for that same prize/treatment condition. The p-values from applying this test
are reported both for mean bids over all rounds and for mean bids over the last 5 rounds
(L5) only. Table 4 reveals that mean bids over all rounds or over the last 5 rounds are close
to but often statistically significantly diﬀerent from Nash equilibrium predictions at the 5
percent level. The sole exception occurs for mean bids under the Majority Rule, Version 2
treatment where by the last 5 rounds, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the median
of the mean bids diﬀers from the Nash equilibrium bid for all four items (  10 for all four
tests).
While mean bids are not a perfect match to the Nash equilibrium point predictions, we
did check whether some other bidding strategy would yield a better outcome. Specifically,
we took the vector of mean bids from each of the four treatments over all rounds as shown in
9For now we ignore other treatment variables such as the order of the payoﬀ rules or whether prizes were
presented in ascending or descending order. We will address the impact of these treatment variables below.
10Tables 10-13 in Appendix B, online supplementary materials provide mean bids for each of the 12 groups
per treatment over various subintervals of time.
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Figures 2-3 and we asked what a best response to those mean bids would be.11 As reported
in Finding 1, we found that for all four treatments, a best response to the vector of mean
bids in the data was, in fact, the Nash equilibrium bid vector! Hence the Nash equilibrium
remains the relevant benchmark for analysis.
We next consider the comparative statics predictions of the theory with regard to a
change in the payoﬀ rule on individual behavior. Specifically, we have:
Finding 2. Individual bids respond to the change in the payoﬀ rule in a manner that is
consistent with equilibrium predictions.
Support for finding 2 comes from Table 5 which reports results from a generalized least
squares (GLS) random eﬀects estimation of the linear model:
 = 0 + 1+ 2 + 3 + 4 +  (11)
Here,  denotes the amount bid on the item with value  by player  in round ,  is a
dummy variable equal to 1 when the total rule was in eﬀect (so the baseline is the majority
rule),  is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the Rule Order was 20 rounds of the total
rule followed by 20 rounds of the majority rule (so the baseline is majority then total) and 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the four items were presented to subjects for bidding in
ascending order of valuation, e.g., {10 25 30 35} (so the baseline is descending order, e.g.,
{35 30 25 10}). The regression (11) was run separately for each prize value under either
Version 1 or Version 2 (8 regressions). The regressions make use of bid data from all four
sessions of either Version 1 or Version 2, consisting of 2,880 individual-level observations on
amounts bid over all 40 rounds for each prize value,  . The regression estimates and robust
standard errors obtained from clustering on matching groups are reported in Table 5.
Table 5 reveals that for nearly every prize, the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable,  
is significantly diﬀerent from zero, and in all cases where this coeﬃcient is significantly
diﬀerent from zero, the coeﬃcient has the theoretically predicted sign (negative or positive).
For example, consider bids for the prize with value 35, 35 under Version 1 — the first column
of Table 5. In the baseline, majority rule case, the coeﬃcient on the constant term indicates
an average bid of 29.98 for this prize which is somewhat less than the predicted bid of 40
for this treatment condition. However, under the total rule there is a statistically significant
increase in the average bid by the amount 985 (the coeﬃcient on  ) taking the average bid
up to 39.83 (ignoring other explanatory factors); the latter is close to the Nash equilibrium
bid prediction of 42 for the total rule treatment. Bids for the other three prizes under Version
1 and bids 25 and 10 under Version 2 display similarly theoretically consistent reactions
when the payoﬀ rule is made the total rule (from the baseline majority rule). The two
exceptions are for 45 and 20 under Version 2; in those two cases the coeﬃcient on  is not
significantly diﬀerent from zero, so that the payoﬀ rule change does not aﬀect bidding for
those two prizes. Notice, however, that the estimated mean bids under the baseline majority
rule treatment (the coeﬃcients on the constant terms as reported in Table 5) are already
close to the Nash equilibrium bids under the Total Rule for Version 2 for these two prize
amounts i.e., 45 = 54 and 20 = 24, and consequently the change in the payoﬀ rule does not
have much eﬀect on bidding for these two prize items.
11Results are available upon request.
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Version 1: {35 30 25 10} Version 2: {45 25 20 10}
35 30 25 10 45 25 20 10
Constant 29.98∗∗∗ 45.41∗∗∗ 40.01∗∗∗ 4.60∗∗∗ 55.03∗∗∗ 23.19∗∗∗ 21.66∗∗∗ 20.10∗∗∗
(1.76) (1.19) (1.32) (0.96) (2.58) (1.52) (1.57) (1.24)
 9.85∗∗∗ -5.39∗∗∗ -8.23∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 1.19 8.92∗∗∗ -0.54 -9.56∗∗∗
(3.22) (2.17) (2.02) (0.86) (1.62) (1.21) (1.10) (1.43)
 1.98 2.11 -4.62∗∗∗ 0.55 3.29 -1.04 -0.37 -1.88
(1.45) (1.42) (1.13) (1.05) (2.85) (0.72) (2.20) (1.22)
 4.63∗∗∗ -2.50∗ -2.97∗∗∗ 0.82 3.92 1.81∗∗ -2.51 -3.23∗∗
(1.45) (1.42) (1.13) (1.05) (3.00) (0.76) (2.20) (1.23)
Round () 0.14 -0.02 -0.03 -0.10∗∗ 0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.10
(0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
2 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.18
No. Obs. 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,880 2,880
***,**,*, indicate significance, respectively, at the .01, .05, and .10 levels.
Table 5: Regression Analysis of Bids for the Four Prizes under Version 1 (Left Columns) or
Version 2 (Right Columns) All Data From All Sessions
Table 5 further reveals that there is not much change in bidding over time, as the es-
timated coeﬃcients on the round  variable are, with a single exception, not significantly
diﬀerent from zero. The sole exception is for bids on the item with value 10 (10) under
version 1 where, in the baseline majority rule treatment, subjects do learn to bid less on this
item, which is never pivotal. Similarly, the payoﬀ rule treatment ordering does not appear
to matter for bidding behavior; with a single exception (25 for Version 1), the coeﬃcient
on the dummy variable  is never significantly diﬀerent from zero indicating that whether
the payoﬀ rule treatment order was 20 rounds of majority rule followed by 20 rounds of the
total rule (the baseline rule order) or the reverse rule order was not much of a factor in
subjects’ bidding behavior. On the other hand, Table 5 also reveals that the coeﬃcient on
the  dummy variable is frequently significantly diﬀerent from zero (in 5 out of the 8 bid
regressions), indicating that the presentation of the four values in ascending order as opposed
to descending order (the baseline) has some eﬀect on bidding behavior. In particular, there
is some evidence that the ascending order increases bids on the higher value items while
decreasing bids on the lower value items, suggesting that players “save” in their initial bids
for items and spend more on later items in the list. While the latter finding is surprising as
it is not predicted by the theory, a mitigating factor is that the impact of the prize order
on bids is, economically speaking, rather small amounting to a change of less than 5 tokens
(or 4.2% of a player’s budget) in all cases. Nevertheless, the latter finding suggests that
we were correct to consider some variation in the prize order so that overall mean bids as
presented in Figures 2-3 and Table 4 take account of the changes in bids that can be induced
by variations in the presentations of the prize values.
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Figure 4: Mean Bids Over all 20 Rounds for the Item with Value 10: Each of the 12 Groups
for the Majority Version 1 Treatment Compared with Each of the 12 Groups for the Majority
Version 2 Treatment.
The next findings address in further detail some of the comparative statics predictions
of the theory, according to whether the majority or total rule was in place.
Finding 3. Under the majority rule, consistent with the theoretical predictions there is near
zero spending on an item that can never be pivotal. Spending on an item with the same
absolute value is higher when that item can be pivotal.
Under the majority rule treatment, the item with the lowest prize value of 10 can never be
pivotal when the prize values are as given in Version 1 and thus bids for this item should be
zero. Table 4 reveals that bids for the item with prize value 10 under Majority Rule Version
1 are indeed low, averaging 426 over all rounds and just 292 over the last 5 rounds of this
treatment. While these bid amounts are diﬀerent from zero, it is instructive to compare bids
for the item with value 10 under both versions of the Majority rule treatment. In particular,
under the Majority Rule Version 2, the lowest valued item also has a prize value of 10 and
can be pivotal. Thus bids for this prize should be strictly positive (the Nash prediction is
a bid of 20). Consider the 12 independent group-level mean bids over all 20 rounds for the
prize with value 10 under Majority Rule, Version 1 as reported in Table 10 and under the
Majority Rule, Version 2 as reported in Table 12 (see Appendix B, online supplementary
materials). For convenience these bids are also presented in Figure 4.
This figure makes it clear that bids for the item with value 10 under the Majority Rule
Version 1 are stochastically dominated by bids for the item with value 10 under the Majority
Rule Version 2. Equivalently, bids for the three items with values above 10 are stochastically
greater under Majority Rule Version 1 as compared with Majority Rule Version 2. Indeed
a Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test using the 12 independent (group) observations for each
treatment condition confirms that we can reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in bids
for the item with value 10 (or bids on all items with values greater than 10) in favor of the
alternative that bids for the item with value 10 (or bids for all items greater than value 10)
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Majority Rule Version 1 Majority Rule Version 2
Null Hypothesis 35 = 30 ¯30 = ¯25 ¯35 = ¯25 ¯25 = ¯20 ¯20 = ¯10 ¯25 = ¯10
WSRT p-value 0.0386 0.0063 1.0000 0.3877 0.7744 0.1460
WSRT L5 p-value 0.3877 0.0386 0.7744 0.3877 0.3877 0.7744
Table 6: Pairwise Bidding Companions, Majority Treatments
are higher (lower) under Version 2 than under Version 1 (  01, one-sided test). Note that
this same finding holds for any of the 7 mean bid subsamples reported in Tables 10 and 12
of Appendix B, online supplementary materials.12 This is strong evidence that pivotality
concerns play an important role as identified in the theory.
Finding 4. Under the majority rule, consistent with the theoretical predictions, we observe
significantly higher spending on items that can be pivotal more often, e.g., item 1 in Version
2.
Using a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test for matched pairs on mean bids from the Majority
Rule Version 2 treatment (see Table 12, online Appendix B) we test whether the 12 inde-
pendent (group) mean bids (over all 20 rounds) for the item with value 45 are significantly
greater than mean bids for each of other three items having values 25, 20 and 10, respec-
tively. We find that we can easily reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in mean bids on
the item with value 45 versus each of the items having values 25, 20 or 10, respectively, in
favor of the alternative that bids are higher for the item with value 45 (  01 for all three
pair-wise comparisons, one-sided test).
Finding 5. Under the majority rule, we observe roughly similar levels of spending on all
items that can be pivotal the same number of times, e.g., items 1-3 under Version 1 and
items 2-4 under Version 2, albeit with some variance, especially in the case of Version 1.
Support for this finding comes from Table 6 which reports the results of several Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks test for matched pairs on bid data from the two Majority Rule treatments.
The test is performed on matched pairs of the group level bid averages for two items (¯) over
all rounds or over the last 5 rounds only (L5). The table reports the -value from various
pairwise null hypotheses of no diﬀerence in bidding behavior (two-sided tests in all cases).
We observe that for Majority rule Version 2, the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in
average bids between items with values 25, 20, and 10 is never rejected (  10 in all
pairwise comparisons). However, for Version 1, we observe that there is excess bidding on
the item with prize value 30 relative to the items with prize values 35 and 25, respectively.
The diﬀerence in mean bids for items with prize values 35 and 30 ceases to be significant
by the final 5 rounds though the diﬀerence in mean bids for the two prizes with values 30
and 25 remains significant even in the final 5 rounds. The excessive bids for the item with
12That is, this finding holds not only for all rounds played but also for the first round, for rounds 1-5,
rounds 6-10,.. etc.
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value 30 relative to the items with values 35 and 25 which are equally pivotal may reflect a
strategic calculation that one’s opponent is more likely to bid for the item with the highest
(35) or lowest (25) prize value among the three items that are equally pivotal toward winning
a majority of item values in this treatment.
Finding 6. Under the total rule, consistent with theoretical predictions, we generally find
that 1) mean bids ¯, are positive for all items and 2) (over all 20 rounds) under Version 1
we generally have that ¯35  ¯30  ¯25  ¯10 while under Version 2 we have that ¯45  ¯25 
¯20  ¯10, that is, token allocations are, on average, increasing with item values.
Specifically, using the data for all rounds as reported in Tables 11 and 13 Appendix B,
online supplementary materials, this ordering is observed to hold for 10 of the 12 groups
under Version 1 and for all 12 groups under Version 2. Where it breaks down under the
total rule for Version 1 is for groups 3 and 6 (see Table 11, online Appendix B) where
overall average bids for the prize with value 35 are less than overall average bids on the
prize with value 30, though average bids on the highest prize of 35 exceeded average bids
on the two lowest prizes with values 25 and 10 in these two sessions. This finding is again
suggestive of some type of strategic avoidance of bidding on the highest valued item in this
treatment. However, we note that under Version 1, there is not as large a diﬀerence between
the valuations of the first two prizes (a diﬀerence of just 5) and this small diﬀerence may
have also played a role in bidding behavior. When the diﬀerence in valuations between the
highest and second highest items is more substantial as in Version 2 (a diﬀerence of 20)
evidence of strategic avoidance of bidding on the highest valued item under the total rule
disappears completely.
The lowest prize, with a valuation of 10 is the same across all four of our treatments and
is therefore a natural focus for comparisons across all treatments. Under the total rule, bids
on this item are predicted to equal 12 under both treatments (Versions 1 and 2). Under the
majority rule Version 1, as previously discussed in Finding 3 bids on this item should be 0
while under the majority rule Version 2, bids on this item should be 20.
Finding 7. Consistent with theoretical predictions, bids for the lowest prize having a com-
mon value of 10 in all four treatments are: a) not significantly diﬀerent from one another
under both Versions 1 and 2 of the total rule, b) significantly lower under majority rule
Version 1 than for the other three treatments and c) significantly higher under the majority
rule Version 2 than for the other three treatments.
Support for this finding comes from pairwiseWilcoxon signed-rank tests or Mann-Whitney
tests (as appropriate) using the 12 independent (group) observations on average bids for the
item with value 10 for each of the four main treatments over all 20 rounds as reported in
Tables 10-13, Appendix B, online supplementary materials. The p-values from the pairwise
tests are summarized in Table 7. In all but one case, we can reject the null hypothesis of
no diﬀerence in favor of the alternative directional prediction of the theory. The one case
where we cannot reject the null hypothesis is in the comparison between the Total Version
1 and Total Version 2 treatments, where consistent with the theory, bids on the item with
prize value 10 are predicted to be exactly the same (12); the fact that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis in this case is thus also consistent with the theoretical prediction.
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Treatment & Prediction Total V1, ¯10 = 12 Total V2, ¯10 = 12 Majority V2, ¯10 = 20
Majority V1, ¯10 = 0 .0027§ .0005 .0000
Total V1, ¯10 = 12 .4356† .0001
Total V2, ¯10 = 12 .0013§
§= Wilcoxon signed rank test; all other tests are Wilcoxon Mann Whitney. †= two-sided test; all other
tests are one-sided.
Table 7: p-values from pairwise tests of the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence in bid amounts
between treatments for the prize with the lowest value of 10. Tests are performed on session-
level bid averages over all 20 rounds.
Having examined the behavior of mean bids across treatments we next consider the distri-
bution of individual bids across our four treatments so as to assess whether these distributions
also conform to predictions of the theory.
Finding 8. The distribution of individual bids is not degenerate at equilibrium predictions.
However, these bid distributions are ordered in such a way as to be consistent with the
comparative statics predictions of the theory.
Support for Finding 8 can be found in Figures 5—6 which show the cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of bid amounts between 0 to 120 tokens for each of the four prizes in each
of the four treatments.
The CDFs presented in Figures 5—6 reveal that the distribution of bid amounts for the
four prizes do not correspond precisely with theoretical predictions. However, the observed
diﬀerences between the bid distributions for the four prizes are strikingly consistent with
the comparative statics predictions of the theory. More precisely, consider the CDFs for
bid amounts under prize vector 1 as shown in Figure 5. Under the majority rule (left panel
of Figure 5) equilibrium bids for the 3 highest prize values should all be 100 percent at
a bid of 40. While these three bid distributions are clearly not degenerate at 40, the bid
distributions for the prizes with values 35, 30, and 25 are all centered around 40 and are
similar to one another. By contrast, under the majority rule the equilibrium bid for the lowest
prize with a value of 10 should be 0 and indeed there is a large mass of bids (427%) at a
bid of 0. Importantly, the bid distribution for this lowest value prize is clearly distinct from
the bid distributions for the 3 highest value prizes. Consider next the distribution of bids
under the total rule for prize vector 1 (right panel of Figure 5). These distributions are all
rather distinct from one another and reflect the monotonic prediction between bids and prize
amounts for this treatment. Similar results are found in the CDFs of bids under prize vector
2 as shown in Figure 6. Under the majority rule (left panel of Figure 6) equilibrium bids for
the 3 lowest value prizes should all be 100 percent at a bid of 20. While the distributions are
clearly not degenerate at 20, they are closely clustered together and centered around 20. By
contrast equilibrium bids for the highest prize with a value of 45 should all be at 60. While
the distribution of bids for this highest value prize is not degenerate at 60, the distribution
of bids for this prize is clearly distinct from the distribution of bids for the other three lower
valued items. Under the total rule for Version 2 (right panel of Figure 6) bid distributions
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Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution of Bid Amounts on the Four Items under the Majority
and Total Rules, Version 1 {35, 30, 25, 10}.
Figure 6: Cumulative Distribution of Bid Amounts on the Four Items under the Majority
and Total Rules, Version 2 {45, 25, 20, 10}
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Treatment Item Number
Conditions 1 2 3 4
Majority Eq. Bid 40 40 40 0
Version 1 Freq. 0.11 0.22 0.15 0.43
Total Eq. Bid 42 36 30 12
Version1 Freq. 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.07
Majority Eq. Bid 60 20 20 20
Version 2 Freq. 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.08
Total Eq. Bid 54 30 24 12
Version 2 Freq. 0.01 0.31 0.02 0.02
Table 8: Frequencies of Bids that Equaled Nash Equilibrium Bid Predictions
are again distinct from one another and correspond precisely to the monotonic prediction
that higher prize values are associated with higher bids.
Using the data presented in these CDFs, we also report on the frequencies with which we
observed equilibrium bids in our data. Specifically, for each treatment and for each item, we
report in Table 8 the frequencies with which players bid exactly the equilibrium predicted
amounts, which are also shown in the Table. We generally find some small mass of bids
at these predicted equilibrium frequencies, especially when the equilibrium prediction is a
multiple of 5. This mass becomes even greater if one allows for bids that are close to but
not precisely equal to the equilibrium bids as the CDFs make clear. For instance, for item
1 of the Total Rule, Version 2, if we consider bids of 54− 55, the frequency of observed bids
in this interval jumps to 0.09 from 0.01 for bids of exactly 54.
Finally, we discuss the adjustment of bids over time. At the aggregate level, there is
some evidence of learning over time in comparisons of the mean bids made by groups over
the first rounds 1-5 and the mean bids made by these same groups over the final rounds,
16-20, using the data of Tables 10-13, Appendix B, online supplementary materials. For
example, consider mean group bids for the prize with value 35 under the Majority Rule,
Version 1 as reported in top panel of Table 10, Appendix B online supplementary materials.
The predicted Nash equilibrium bid for this item is 40. Notice that over the first five rounds
(Rnds 1-5) 10 of the 12 groups have mean bids below 40 while only two groups have mean
bids above 40. Of the 10 groups with mean initial bids below 40, 7 of these 10 groups had
increased mean bids for this same item over the last 5 rounds (Rnds 16-20). Of the 2 groups
with mean bids initially above 40, 1 had decreased its mean bid by the final 5 rounds. Thus,
8 of the 12 groups who bid for this item in this treatment — a majority — exhibit some
evidence of aggregate equilibration toward Nash equilibrium bids over time. Carrying out
a similar analysis for all other prize value/treatment conditions we can report that for at
least 6 of the 12 groups, if the average group bid for an item over the first rounds 1-5 was
below (above) the predicted Nash equilibrium bid for that item then the average bid by that
same group for that same item over the last rounds 16-20 was higher (lower) in 14 of the 16
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prize/treatment conditions reported on in Tables 10-13, online Appendix B.13 This finding
provides some evidence of aggregate equilibration toward equilibrium bids.
We look for further evidence of learning behavior by exploring how individual bids diﬀered
from Nash equilibrium bids over time. Recall from Finding 1 that NE bids remain a best
response to the actual mean bids in all four treatments of our experiment; hence the mean
squared deviation (MSD) of individual bids from NE bids is a good measure of each subject’s
deviation from best response behavior. We define the mean squared deviation of individual
’s 4-element bid vector in period  from the vector of Nash equilibrium bids by () =
1
4
P4=1(()−  )2, where  refers to the Nash equilibrium bid for item , which depends
on the prize vector, Version 1 or 2, and the rule, majority or total that was in place in period
. Using this MSD variable as the dependent variable, we ran GLS random eﬀects regressions
of the same form as equation (11), using the same explanatory variables described earlier
in connection with Table 5, again with robust standard errors clustered on an individual’s
group membership. The results are reported in Table 9. Regressions using the data from
both the Majority and Total Rule treatments are under the heading “All Data”; we also
report on separate regressions of the MSD under either the “Majority” rule alone or the
“Total” rule alone for each prize vector (thus excluding the  variable).
Version 1: {35 30 25 10} Version 2: {45 25 20 10}
MSD of bids from NE Pred. MSD of bids from NE Pred.
All Data Majority Total All Data Majority Total
Constant 302.07∗∗∗ 274.38∗∗∗ 208.28∗∗∗ 404.97∗∗∗ 396.07∗∗∗ 223.03∗∗∗
28.16 40.87 27.95 53.28 52.37 53.09
 -121.08∗∗∗ -190.84∗∗∗
23.32 29.17
 40.54 70.07 11.27 20.76 43.37 45.70
34.56 45.21 34.29 57.97 77.75 -0.04
 -63.77 -41.61 -86.19∗ -107.54∗ -142.45∗ -72.63
34.51 45.21 34.32 57.96 77.62 45.70
Round(t) -1.82 -1.64 -1.97∗ -0.10 1.33 -1.53
1.13 1.98 1.08 1.67 2.74 1.78
2 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.03
Nobs 2880 1440 1440 2880 1440 1440
***,**,*, indicate significance, respectively, at the .01, .05, and .10 levels.
Table 9: Regression Analysis of MSDs of Bids from NE Predictions in Version 1 (Left
Columns) or Version 2 (Right Columns) All Data From All Sessions
13The exceptions are for a prize value of 10 under the Majority rule, Version 2 (Table 12, online Appendix
B) and for a prize value of 45 under the Total rule, Version 2 (Table 13, online Appendix B). In these two
cases only 5 of the 12 groups exhibit evidence for equilibration in terms of the diﬀerence in their mean bids
over the first and last 5 rounds.
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Figure 7: Distribution of mean squared deviations (MSDs) from NE bids, Majority vs. Total,
Version 1 (left), Version 2 (right)
The regression results reported in Table 9 indicate that the mean squared deviations of
individual’s bids from NE predictions are significantly lower under the total rule treatment as
compared with the majority rule treatment for both prize vectors, Versions 1 and 2. Indeed,
the rule change seems to be the most significant factor in explaining the MSDs, judging
from the large impact that the rule change has on the MSD. Evidence for this can be found
in the significantly negative coeﬃcient attached to the  dummy variable in Table 9. We
speculate that MSDs are higher under the Majority rule because the equilibrium requires that
subjects consider the pivotality of each item, which can be diﬃcult to calculate. By contrast,
equilibrium bids under the Total rule are proportional to prize values and those calculations
are easier for subjects to make, as well as being more intuitive. Other explanatory variables
that sometimes play a significant role in these regressions are the dummy variable for whether
the prize values were presented in ascending order and, in one instance only, the round
number. An ascending prize order has a marginally negative impact on MSD, particularly
under Version 2 where the ascending prize order is 10 20 25 45. The coeﬃcient on the
round number is almost always negative suggesting that there is a slight reduction in MSD
over time, but this coeﬃcient is only significantly negative under the total rule for prize
vector 1 and the coeﬃcient is small in magnitude.
In addition to a regression analysis involving MSDs, we also considered the distribution of
MSDs between the two treatments, Majority and Total, and whether there is any correlation
in subjects’ MSD as we move from one treatment to the other all under the same vector
of prize values (version 1 or version 2). Figure 7 shows the distribution of MSDs under
the Majority and Total rules for Versions 1 and 2, respectively. Consistent with the results
reported in Table 9, we observe that the MSDs under the Total rule are skewed more to
left (closer to a MSD of 0) than are the MSDs under the Majority rule. This observation
lends further support to the notion that subjects’ had a more diﬃcult time playing a best
response under the Majority rule than under the Total rule. We also find that there is a
correlation between each subject’s MSD under the Majority rule and their MSD under the
Total rule (again, for a given version of the prize vector). Specifically, for Prize Vector 1, the
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correlation coeﬃcient, 0.52, is positive and statistically significant (  01,  = 72) while
for Prize Vector 2, the correlation coeﬃcient, 0.51, is also positive and statistically significant
(  01,  = 72). Thus, subjects who were closer to (further from) playing best responses
under one rule are also likely to be closer to (further from) from playing best responses
under the other rule. Taken together, these results suggest that much of the adjustment in
subjects’ bids is a consequence of the rule change alone with very little modification to bids
in response to experience or other factors under a given rule. We summarize these findings
as follows:
Finding 9. Individual bids are significantly closer to equilibrium bids under the total rule
than under the majority rule. Individual bids under both rules adjust only slowly toward
NE bids with experience. Individual deviations from NE bids under the two diﬀerent rules
are positively correlated.
6. Summary and Conclusions
The stochastic, asymmetric value Blotto game has many applications, e.g., to warfare, ad-
vertising and political campaigns. In this paper we present results from an experimental
study of this version of the Blotto game under two commonly used objective functions: a
majority rule objective and a total expected payoﬀ objective. The majority rule objective
is particularly relevant to understanding electoral competitions in two party systems, e.g.,
the electoral college system for electing the U.S. president, while the total expected payoﬀ
version is relevant to understanding competition between duopoly firms for market share.
Despite the seeming similarity between the two objective functions, equilibrium bid alloca-
tions under the majority rule objective are quite diﬀerent than under the total expected
payoﬀ objective. In particular, for the equal budget constraint case that we study, bids for
each item under the majority rule objective are proportional to the Banzhaf index of an
item’s power. By contrast, bids under the total rule are proportional to the relative value of
each item.
To test these theoretical predictions, we report the results of a laboratory experiment
comparing bidding behavior in stochastic, asymmetric 4-item Blotto games under the ma-
jority rule objective with bidding for the same items under the total rule objective using a
within-subjects design. We consider two diﬀerent prize vectors so as to further test some of
the comparative statics implications of the theory. Our experimental results are shown to
be qualitatively (if not perfectly quantitatively) consistent with the theoretical predictions
for how players should allocate their bids across the four items, confirming that the diﬀering
payoﬀ function objectives matter for allocations.
Future research on this topic might proceed in several dimensions. First, one could
attempt to incorporate some other potentially important features of the U.S. electoral college
system (that we have left out) for instance, the fact that certain states (items) are ex-ante
more likely to be won by one player or the other, or relaxing the assumption that the winner
of an item gets all of that items’ value.14 Another possible extension would be to consider
14Of the 51 states in the electoral college, all but two assign all of their electoral votes to the winner of
the state. The two exceptions, Maine and Nebraska, assign electoral votes in a more proportional manner:
1 electoral vote is awarded to the winner of each Congressional district within the state and the remaining
2 electoral votes are awarded to the state-wide winner.
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super-majority rules and examine how allocations are aﬀected relative to the majority rule
case. We leave these extensions to future research.
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• We experimentally study Col. Blotto games with asymmetric values using a lottery 
contest success function. 
• We compare behavior under total expected payoff and majority rule payoff objectives.  
• Equilibrium allocations are in pure strategies and differ according to the payoff objective. 
• We find support for these different equilibrium allocations in our experimental data. 
 
